83 Verbatim Record, 682nd meeting, 14 October 1954, doc. S/P.V. 682, pp. 57-58. I know my friend on the right doesn`t want to fool me. I have not elaborated on the whole subject today, but he will remember that the last time I spoke, tried to make it clear that if, from the beginning, there had been a different 814 approach for Egypt, if we had not talked about evacuation from the beginning, we would not have taken that decision, and that if we made it clear – even now – that we were serious and wanted to stay there, we could conclude an agreement with this government or another Egyptian government that would allow us to maintain our armed forces and maintain our position. I would like to respond to other questions raised by our critics. As far as the issue of damage is concerned, we do not need to wait for the agreement. We are trying to resolve them now and we have already started discussing them with the Egyptian government.

Of course, we have not lost interest in Sudan. We said in 815 that Sudan had to decide its own future. Tonight, I do not want to say harsh things about the past with regard to the Sudan agreements, although I could do so. I would just like to say that in Britain we are not against the friendship between Egypt and Sudan. We ourselves want to have friendship with Egypt and the Sudan, but we hope that all parties concerned will give the Sudan a real chance to decide on its own national life and its future. All the reports we have received in recent months show that the Sudan is increasingly determined to do so. In addition, we have no right to assert in our law. On November 18, 1954, Minister of State Anthony Nutting explained the extent of these restrictions. He told the House of Commons that “it is only ships that carry strategic cargoes for Israel, of course with all Israeli ships, regardless of the cargo that will be denied passage. The type of cargo left in non-Israeli ships is food stocks, meat stocks and so on non-strategic cargoes. In other words, cargoes outside the area of things such as oil deliveries, which are included for this purpose in strategic cargoes.

“Hansard, a.a.O., Sps. 219-220. Is the good man of honor saying that he really was not an obstacle in the cabinet – and that he made it known to the people behind him – to the wish of the services and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to conclude an agreement on the withdrawal from Egypt? The bases should clearly be Alexandria, Basra in the Persian Gulf or, like the honourable Member of Dudley (Mr Wigg), with Israel`s agreement, if possible, Haifa. This is the conception of a redeployment that I believe is complete and quite reasonable for hot war. On September 23, 1945, after the end of World War II, the Egyptian government requested the modification of the treaty in order to end the British military presence and allow the annexation of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. [3] After the victory of the Wafd party in the boycotted elections in Egypt in 1950, the new Wafd government unilaterally terminated the treaty in October 1951. Three years later, and under a new governance led by Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, the United Kingdom agreed, in the Anglo-Egyptian agreement of 1954, to the withdrawal of its troops; the British withdrawal was completed in June 1956. This date is considered the date on which Egypt gained full independence, when Nasser had already established an independent foreign policy that created tensions with several Western powers.

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