Despite the conclusion of such an agreement with the British, Nasser`s position remained bad. The loss of Egypt`s claim to Sudan, coupled with Britain`s continued presence in Suez for another two years, led to domestic political unrest, including an assassination attempt on it in October 1954. The meager nature of Nasser`s reign led him to believe that neither his regime nor Egypt`s independence would be certain until Egypt established itself as the leader of the Arab world.  This was to manifest itself in the questioning of British interests in the Middle East throughout 1955. Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai met Nasser at the Bandung Conference in 1955 and was impressed by him. Zhou recommended that Khrushchev treat Nasser as a potential ally.  Zhou described Nasser to Khrushchev as a young nationalist who, although not a communist, could, if used correctly, cause great harm to Western interests in the Middle East. Marshal Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia, who also met Nasser in Bandung, said Khrushchev at a meeting in 1955: “Nasser was a young man without much political experience, but if we give him the advantage of the doubt, we might be able to exert a positive influence on him, both for the good of the communist movement. and. the Egyptian people.”  Traditionally, most of the Egyptian army`s equipment came from Britain, but Nasser`s desire to break British influence in Egypt meant that he was desperately looking for a new source of weapons to replace Britain. Nasser first raised the issue of buying weapons from the Soviet Union in 1954.  On the 23rd. In September 1945, after the end of World War II, the Egyptian government requested that the treaty be amended to end the British military presence and allow for the annexation of Anglo-Egyptian Sudan.
 After the victory of the Wafd party in the boycotted elections in Egypt in 1950, the new Wafd government unilaterally abrogated the treaty in October 1951. Three years later, and with new governance under Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, the United Kingdom agreed to the withdrawal of its troops in the Anglo-Egyptian Agreement of 1954; the British withdrawal was completed in June 1956. This date is considered a time when Egypt gained full independence, although Nasser had already established an independent foreign policy that caused tensions with several Western powers. 3 An agreed record annexed to the Agreement expressly excludes Israel from the definition of “external power”. I am pleased to inform the House that we have reached an agreement in principle with the Egyptian Government on the future of the Suez Canal Zone. The full text of the Heads of Government of the Agreement and the annex on the organisation of the base will be distributed in the OFFICIAL REPORT and will also be available this evening in the form of a White Paper. In the meantime, I would like to give a brief summary of their provisions. The agreement is as effective as if it had entered into force on the date of its signature; Ratifications were exchanged in Cairo on 6 December 1954. New York Times, December 7, 1954, p. 3. After the abrupt withdrawal of an offer by Britain and the United States to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam, Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956, allegedly to pay for the dam, when in reality the Soviets provided most of the funding. Nationalization technically violates the international agreement signed by Nasser on October 19, 1954, although he agreed to pay compensation to shareholders.
A few months later, France, Israel and Britain conspired to overthrow Nasser, and the Suez crisis followed. Hasan Afif El-Hasan says that in 1955-1956, the Americans offered Nasser a peaceful resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict in exchange for funding for the Nile Dam, but Nasser rejected the offer because it would mean siding with the West during the Cold War (as opposed to neutral). Given that the alternative to a peace deal is a war with unpredictable consequences, Nasser`s refusal to accept the proposal is irrational, el-Hasan said.  83 Verbatim Record, 682nd Session, October 14, 1954, Doc. S/P.V. 682, pp. 57-58. 103 See “Turkey-Iraq Pact Opens New Chapter in the Middle East,” New York Times, News of the Week in Review, February 27, 1955, p. 5; March 3, 1955, p. 5.
Iraq does not consider its accession to the Turkish-Iraqi Pact to be incompatible with its obligations under the PCSA, and article IV of the former Agreement stipulates that obligations under the Covenant are not contrary to the international commitments undertaken by either party with one or more third countries. Franco-American relations have never recovered from the Suez crisis.  There are several reasons for this. Previously, there had already been tensions in Franco-American relations, triggered by what Paris saw as a betrayal by the United States of the French war effort in Indochina near Dien Bien Phu in 1954.  The incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in its lack of planning and cooperation beyond the European stage. Mollet felt that Eden should have postponed the convening of the cabinet until November 7, in the meantime take the full channel and then veto any UN sanctions resolution with the Frenchman. From General de Gaulle`s point of view, the events at Suez showed France that it could not rely on its allies; the British had initiated an armistice in the middle of the battle without consulting the French, while the Americans had fought Paris politically. The damage to relations between Paris and Washington, D.C., “culminated in President de Gaulle`s decision in 1966 to withdraw from NATO`s military integration.”  The Suez War had an immense influence on French domestic politics. Much of the French army officer corps felt “betrayed” by what they saw as spineless politicians in Paris as they were on the brink of victory, just as they believed they had been “betrayed” in Vietnam in 1954, and thus became more determined to win the war in Algeria, even if it meant overthrowing the Fourth Republic.  The Suez Crisis thus contributed to the military disillusionment with the Fourth Republic, which was to lead to the collapse of the Republic in 1958.  According to the Protocol to the Sèvres Accords, France secretly transmitted parts of its own nuclear technology, including a detonator, to Israel.  62 Great Britain, Parl.
Deb. (Hansard), House of Commons, Official Report, Vol. 532, No. 171, 2 November 1954, col. 222.55 This port, considered the largest military port in the Middle East, was reportedly handed over to the Egyptian authorities in September 1954 […].