Social contract theories also require some rules to guide the formation of agreements. Since they are before the treaty, there must be a source of previous moral norms, whether natural, rational or conventional. The first rule, normally mandatory, is that there must be no violence or fraud in the making of the agreement. No one should be “forced” to accept by the threat of physical violence. The reason for this is simply cautious: if force can be used, there is no real difference between the “treaty” that has been concluded and the state of nature for the threatened party and therefore no security in the agreement. However, there is a narrow line between the coercion of the threat of violence to renounce one`s rights and the belief that the threat of distress convinces one to reach an unfavourable agreement. This is why opponents like Gauthier are able to argue for a fair and impartial starting point for negotiations that result in secure and stable agreements. The second rule of the contract is that any person who is a legitimate party to the treaty must accept the rules of justice that are the results of the treaty. Two other criticisms can be made against contractarism (Southwood 2010). According to the objection of normativity, contractual morality is not sufficiently different because it motivates morality by appealing to the personal interest and not to the concern of others. For this reason, the theory gives no reason to feel guilt or remorse for mistakes, but at most self-controlled anger or disappointment in the face of irrational action.

Southwood`s objection can be seen as a way to fulfill Superson`s assertion above, that Gauthier`s theory cannot answer the skeptic of motive. This objection does not take into account the fact that some appeal to the concerns of others both in the Lockean Proviso and in the theory of negotiation, from which the content of moral norms is deduced. Moreover, Kantsche`s moral theory seems to be subject to the same objection, insofar as it invokes autonomous rationality as a ground for moral action. . . .